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WARRANTLESS ARRESTS IN POLICE STANDOFFS: A 
COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO THE EXIGENCY 
EXCEPTION 
Elizabeth E. Forbes* 
INTRODUCTION 
The old adage "a man's home is his castle" reflects a bedrock principle 
of our nation: we are protected from unreasonable governmental intrusions 
behind the sanctity of our front doors.' This principle is embodied in the 
Fourth Amendment, which grants "[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their . . . houses . . . against unreasona):>le searches and seizures.'" But 
while we take comfort in the constitutional protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures within our homes, the question remains - what is 
meant by the word "unreasonable"? 
The Supreme Court provided the analytical framework for answering 
this question in the landmark case of Payton v. New York." In Payton, the 
Court held that police must generally get a warrant in order for a search or 
seizure to be constitutionally reasonable, absent one exception.' If emer-
gency circumstances exist, and due to these circumstances it is not possible 
I 
*Candidate for J.D., 2009, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of 
Richmond (Manuscripts Editor of the University of Richmond Law Review). B.A., 
2005, University of Massachusetts - Amherst. 
The author would like to thank Professor Corinna B. Lain for her interest in and 
amazing support of this article. 
1 See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13 (1937); Ken Gormley, One 
Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1358 (1992) (quoting Legal 
Papers of John Adams, I, 137-38). This principle is traceable not only to English ju-
risprudence but even ancient law. See LASSON, supra. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. JV. The Fourth Amendment's history reflects the value 
placed on the sanctity of the home. See Gormley, supra note I, at 1358. Its inclusfon 
in the Constitution was a direct result of the broad search and seizure powers held by 
the English monarchy at the time. Id. Seizures were indiscriminate, people and loca-
tions were not identified by warrant, and the government had the full power and 
range to effectuate almost any type of search. LASSON, supra note l, at 26. In mid-
seventeenth century England, however, critics began to speak out against general 
Warrants and the general distrust of such pervasive police search and seizure power 
migrated to the American colonies. Id. at 58-60. 
3 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, JOOS. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980). 
'Payton, 445 U.S. at 576. The process of obtaining a warrant is thought to impose 
order by requiring a specific procedure be followed, and, most importantly, by hav-
mg "a neutral and detached magistrate" make an '"informed and deliberate"' de-
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to obtain a warrant, the Supreme Court held that a search or seizure in the 
home may be lawfully made without one.5 The question then becomes, what 
circumstances constitute exigency? · 
Herein lies the problem. The Supreme Court in Payton declined to 
identify what circumstances would qualify as exigencies, or what test should 
be applied by courts to determine if exigency exists.• Lower courts have 
been left to grapple with the issue, and in so doing, have created a rather 
large and extensive body of case law defining exigency. Exigency has been 
thoroughly examined in the context of hot pursuit, destruction of evidence, 
and protection of life and limb.' Unfortunately, a neglected area of inquiry 
has been the issue of exigency in police standoff situations. In a post-
September 11th world, police standoffs showcase the conflict between police 
power that is necessary to diffuse deadly situations, and the Fourth Amend-
ment values we as a society hold so dear. 
Recently, the Ninth Circuit held as a matter of first impression that po-
lice must continuously reevaluate the presence of exigent circumstances dur-
ing a standoff, and obtain a warrant if exigency abates at any time.' This dif-
fers from the Sixth Circuit's position on this issue, which is that a police 
exigency continues throughout the duration of a standoff if it is found to 
have existed at the start, completely excusing the warrant requirement.' With 
an emerging circuit split on the issue, and almost nothing in current scholar-
ship to guide courts or police, the time has come to evaluate the exigency 
exception to the warrant requirement in the context of police standoffs. 
termination on the issue of whether probable cause exists. Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 
10, 13-14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948) (quoting U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 
452, 464, 52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775 (1932)). Police officers should 
not be the final determination on whether probable cause exists for a seizure, because 
of their inherent bias as they engage "in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting 
out crime.'' Id. 
5 Payton, 445 U.S. at 603. 
6 Payton, 445 U.S. at 749. 
7 See generally Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 
L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006) (holding that police can enter a home without a warrant to end 
violence); U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1976) 
(holding that a suspect cannot evade an arrest that starts in public by fleeing into his 
home);.Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 8'1 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. 
Ed. 2d 782 (1967) (holding that entering a home without a warrant to apprehend a 
fleeing suspect is justified through exigency); Ker v. State of Cal., 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. 
Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963) (holding that ifthere is a substantial likelihood 
evidence will be destroyed, exigency justifies a warrantless entry). 
6 See Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane 
granted, 519 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008), on reh'g en bane, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 
2009). Subsequent to this decision, a rehearing en bane was granted on March 14, 
2008. Fisher v. City of San Jose, 519 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008), on reh'g en bane, 558 
F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2009). Ultimately, the issue will not be resolved until the 
Supreme Court decides to grant certiorari. 
9 See Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555, 2006 FED App. 
0270P (6th Cir. 2006). 
468 
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS IN POLICE STANDOFFS 
In the discussion that follows, I argue that exigency in police standoff 
situations should be governed by the clearer, more common sense rule 
adopted by the Sixth Circuit - namely that exigency exists due to the inher-
ent danger of a police standoff, and is not negated by the mere passage of 
time. Part I provides a backdrop for the discussion, presenting an overview 
of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on exigency cases. Part II discusses 
the differing Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit approaches to exigency in po-
lice standoffs. Part III argues that the better position on exigency in police 
standoff situations is the Sixth Circuit approach, because it provides a clear 
rule for police and courts to apply. In the end, courts should give heed to 
common sense in recognizing that standoffs are inherently dangerous and as / 
such constitute exigent circumstances. · 
I. DOCTRINAL LANDSCAPE: THE SUPREME COURT'S 
INADEQUATE GUIDE TO EXIGENCY 
Although the Supreme Court declined to provide a test or framework to 
determine exigency in Payton, it has taken a number of cases since that ad-
dress the issue. These cases create a give and take of sorts, in that some of 
the cases grant police broad power to act without warrants, while other cases 
simultaneously impose limitations that restrict that power. Unfortunately, 
the cases are so fact specific that they offer little guidance for lower courts. 
A. The Supreme Court Gives 
The Supreme Court since Payton has identified three specific exigent 
circumstances where a warrantless arrest in the home is constitutional. These 
exigency exceptions are: hot pursuit, the destruction of evidence, and serious 
threat of bodily injury.10 If any of these delineated exigencies exist, police 
have broad authority to arrest without first obtaining a warrant. In fact, this 
authority is so broad that the Supreme Court has held an officer's subjective 
intent to be irrelevant if one of the exceptions exists.11 
The first, and perhaps the most common exception to the warrant require-
ment is hot pursuit. The Supreme Court held in Warden v. Hayden 12 that 
when police start to make an arrest in public, but the arrestee flees into his or 
her home to avoid police, a warrantless arrest in the home is justified.13 The 
public policy considerations of this exception are paramount.14 First, police 
must be able to protect their own lives and those of the public by quickly ap-
lO PAUL R. JOSEPH, w ARRANTLESS SEARCH LA w DESKBOOK 19-9 to 19-16 (Clark, 
Boardman, Callaghan 1993) (1991). 
11 See Brigham, 547 U.S. at 398. 
12 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 
2d 782 (1967). 
13 Warden, 387 U.S. at 298-99. 
14 Warden, 387 U.S. at 298-99. 
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prehending a fleeing arrestee." Second, an arrestee should not be able to find 
safe harbor from police by fleeing into his home. The Constitution protects 
against unwarranted goverrunental intrusions in the home, not an arrestee's 
right to call "home base" as in a childhood game of tag. The Supreme Court 
in United States v. Santana'• further clarified that the term hot pursuit, while 
requiring "some sort of chase," does not need to be "an extended hue and 
cry 'in and about (the) public streets."'" The hot pursuit exception can be 
invoked in any situation in which a person evades arrest by retreating into 
the home.1• 
The hot pursuit exigency exception is generally not a good fit to justify a 
warrantless arrest during a police standoff. While it is true that an extensive 
police chase does not have to exist to invoke this exception, the minimum 
requirement is that the police attempt an arrest outside of the home, with the 
arrestee then fleeing inside. Therefore, in cases in which police do not first 
attempt the arrest outside of the home, this exception is not applicable. 
Second, the Supreme Court has also carefully carved out an exigency 
exception to protect against the destruction of evidence. In Ker v. Califor-
nia, 19 police entered the home of a suspected narcotics dealer who was on 
notice that their arrival was imminent.'0 Police entered his home and arrested 
him without a warrant, as they were concerned that in the time it took to get 
a warrant, he would dispose of the drugs." The Supreme Court found that 
exigency justified the warrantless arrest because of the large possibility that 
evidence would be destroyed.22 While recognizing the protection that the 
Fourth Amendment provides against unreasonable seizures, the Supreme 
Court opined that "suspects have no constitutional right to dispose of or de-
stroy evidence.' ' 23 
This exception is not applicable in a police standoff situation. Generally, 
there is no evidence that is in danger of being destroyed in a police standoff. 
The general application of this exception will be cases in which there are 
narcotics present, as these are easy to dispose of quickly. Although there are 
weapons present in a standoff that are usually evidence of the crime, there 
would not feasibly be a way to dispose of them in the home. 
Third, the Supreme Court has further recognized exigency when police 
15 Warden, 387 U.S. at 298-99. 
16 U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 ('1976). 
17 Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43. In fact, the suspect in Santana was standing in the 
doorway to her home when police announced their presence. Id. at 40. She retreated 
into her home, and this was deemed sufficient for hot pursuit. Id. "The fact that the 
pursuit here ended almost as soon as it began did not render it any the less a 'hot 
pursuit' sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into Santana's house." Id. at 43. 
18 See Santana, 427 U.S. at 43. 
19 Ker v. State of Cal., 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963). 
2° Ker, 374 U.S. at 40. 
21 Ker, 374 U.S. at 40. 
22 Ker, 374 U.S. at40-41. 
"Ker, 374 U.S. at 39. 
470 
-..,.. 
I 
! 
! 
I 
l 
,A 
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS IN POLICE STANDOFFS 
"need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such 
injury. " 24 In Brigham City v. Stuart, 25 the Court examined the Fourth 
Amendment in relation to the preservation of life and protection of individu-
als from bodily injury.•• Police saw a fight break out inside a home and 
entered, breaking up the altercation and arresting those involved." The 
Supreme Court upheld the warrantless arrests, reasoning that police needed 
to intervene to protee<t the occupants." The Court made clear that in balanc-
ing justifications, the need to protect life or avoid serious injury outweighs 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, and to hold otherwise would be 
"silly. " 29 Therefore, the Supreme Court has found that exigency vitiates the 
warrant requirement in such life or death situations.30 
This exigency exception applies in police standoffs. The batricaded ar-
restee presents a real and serious threat of bodily injury, not only to 
themselves, but also to the public at large and officers on the scene. The issue 
in police standoffs really is not which exigency exception applies, as it clearly 
is the threat of serious bodily injury, but rather when is exigency assessed? 
Is the threat one that exists at the start and therefore throughout a standoff? 
Or as time passes, can the exigency abate to the point that a warrant is 
required? Later Supreme Court cases examine exigency over extended dura-
tions of time, and these cases are to some extent more useful for the standoff 
analysis than the basic threat of bodily injury cases. 
B. The Supreme Court Takes 
While the Supreme Court has recognized a few exigency exceptions, 
and thus given broad powers to police to work without warrants, the Court 
has subsequently taken some of this power away by limiting the circum-
stances in which warrantless arrests can be effectuated. Namely, the Supreme 
Court has stated that the offense must be sufficiently serious in nature to 
justify a warrantless arrest in the home due to exigent circumstances. 31 In 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 32 the Supreme Court examined the warrantless arrest of 
a man in his home after he left the scene of an accident he caused while driv-
24 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 
2d 650 (2006). 
25 Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 
(2006). 
"Brigham, 547 U.S. at 403. 
27 Brigham, 547 U.S. at 401. 
28 Brigham, 547 U.S. at 406. 
29 Brigham, 547 U.S. at 406 ("It would be silly to suggest that the police would 
commit a tort by entering . . . to determine whether violence (or threat of violence) 
has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur." (quoting Georgia v. Rarn;lolph, 
547 U.S. 103, 118, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2006))). 
30 See Brigham, 547 U.S. at 406. 
31 See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 
(1984). 
32 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984). 
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ing drunk. 33 The government argued that under the facts of the case, there 
were two exigencies to justify the warrantless arrest - hot pursuit and de-
struction of evidence.34 The Supreme Court first rejected the hot pursuit 
argument, recognizing that "there was no immediate or continuous pursuit 
of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.' '35 Also, since the arrestee had 
gone home and left his car, he was no longer a threat to public safety.36 
Interestingly, the Court did not expressly determine whether the need to 
quickly obtain the arrestee's blood alcohol level would qualify for the de-
struction of evidence exigency exception to the warrant requirement."' The 
Court recognized that even if the possibility of destruction of evidence 
existed, it would not, under the facts of this case, be sufficient justification 
for exigency without a more serious underlying offense. 38 While the Court 
found the seriousness of the offense to be one factor in a totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis, it simultaneously found that the government would 
rarely be able to prevail under exigency if the offense was minor."' Ef-
fectively then, the seriousness of the offense is not so much a factor in a 
totality of the circumstances analysis, but rather is a preliminary requirement 
for a claim of exigent circumstances.40 
The Supreme Court in Welsh declined to articulate a bright line standard 
for what crimes qualify as "serious offenses."" In fact, while the Court 
noted numerous lower court decisions that considered the seriousness of the 
offense, it refused to approve of any of the holdings or address more factual 
scenarios." In determining what crimes are serious enough to merit the 
exigency exception, however, most lower courts look to the legislative body 
of that jurisdiction to see how the crime is classified, as well as the pnnish-
ment associated with the crirne.43 Generally, only violent crimes will qualify 
as serious enough to merit the exigency exception." In both the Sixth Circuit 
and Ninth Circuit cases involving police standoffs discussed in this article, 
an underlying felony was committed to justify the claim of exigency." 
33 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742-43. 
34 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742-43. 
35 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742-43. 
36 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742-43. 
37 Welsh, 466 p".S. at 754. 
38 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754. 
39 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. The Court did not provide any examples in which 
exigency would justify a warrantless home arrest for a minor offense. See id. 
40 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 759 (White, J., dissenting). 
41 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 (majority opinion). 
42 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. 
43 JOSEPH, supra note 10, at 19-2. 
44 JOSEPH, supra note 10, at 19-2. 
45 Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane 
granted, 519 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008), on reh'g en bane, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 
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C. Time Marches On 
None of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on exigency applies specifi-
cally to police standoff situations. One of the most notable problems in 
analyzing exigency for police standoffs is that standoffs involve a consider-
able passage of time. All of the previously noted exceptions involve a war-
rantless arrest following immediately on the heels of an emergency situation. 
What happens when exigency exists, but many hours pass? Does this time 
affect the exigency? Two cases addressed by the Supreme Court do concern 
exigency over a period of time, which is the closest the Supreme Court has 
come to giving guidance that could be used in determining whether eiigency 
exists in a police'standoff. The two Supreme Court cases, Mincey v. Arizona.,. 
and Michigan v. Tyler, 47 were heavily relied on by both the Sixth Circuit in 
Bing v. City of Whitehall" and the Ninth Circuit in Fisher v. City of San 
Jose" in their analyses of exigency during police standoffs. Unfortunately 
the Supreme Court cases, while nqt being directly on point, are also difficult 
to reconcile with one another, thus further exacerbating the confusion for 
lower courts. 
In Michigan v. Tyler, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether 
the mere passage of time can negate exigency, thereby imposing the warrant 
requirement on a Fourth Amendment event that had previously not required 
a warrant.'0 The case involved a nighttime fire that was believed to be the 
result of arson.51 After the fire had been reduced to mere embers, detectives 
arrived at the scene and began a search without a warrant." Due to the heavy 
smoke and lack of light, the men left the scene and returned four hours later, 
in the daylight, continuing again without a warrant." The second entry was a 
much more thorough search, which included removing portions of the carpet-
ing and stairs.54 First, the Court recognized that the fire qualified as an exigent 
circumstance that justified the initial warrantless entry.55 The Court reasoned 
that an important function of firefighters is to determine the cause of a fire, 
and this must be done promptly to prevent reoccurrence as well as preserve 
2009); Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555, 565, 2006 FED 
App. 0270P (6th Cir. 2006). 
46 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978). 
47 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978). 
48 Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555, 2006 FED App. 
0270P (6th Cir. 2006). 
49 Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2007), reh' g en bane granted, 
519 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008), on reh'g en bane, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2009). 
50 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511. 
51 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 502. 
52 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 502. 
53 Tyler, 436 U.S. at.502. 
54 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 502. 
55 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509. 
473 
i-· 
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
evidence." The Court noted that to require a warrant as soon as the last 
flame was extinguished would put too much of a burden on fire 
investigators. 57 The issue then was whether a warrant was needed for the 
second entry, as four hours had passed since the initial exigent entry into the 
building.'" The Supreme Court held that since the original warrantless search 
of the building was reasonable due to the exigency of the fire, the later entry 
was also reasonable, and was simply a continuation of the first." 
Just Jess than a month after the decision in Tyler, the Supreme Court 
decided Mincey v. Arizona, another case that examined whether exigency 
dissipates due to the passage of time. In Mincey, the Supreme Court declined 
to apply the exigency exception to a warrantless homicide search that began 
with an initial sweep for safety, but lasted for over four days.60 Police had ar-
ranged an undercover drug bust of an apartment, which did not go according 
to plan, and an officer was shot and killed in a fire exchange inside the 
apartment. 61 Immediately after the officer was shot, police quickly looked 
about the apartment for other victims, but refrained from conducting a full 
scale search of the crime scene at that time.62 Within ten minutes however, 
homicide investigators were on the scene, and so began a four-day search of 
the apartment."' During this period, police did not obtain a warrant.64 The 
Supreme Court rejected the government's argument of exigent 
circumstances.05 The Court did not question the general right of police to re-
spond to emergency situations without a warrant, but reiterated that a homi-
cide investigation presented no such emergency.66 While a prompt, warrant-
less sweep of a crime scene is appropriate to protect life, a four-day search is 
not appropriate without a warrant."' The Court opined, "[a]ll the persons in 
Mincey's apartment had been located before the investigating homicide of-
ficers arrived there and began their search. And a four-day search that 
included opening dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be 
rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency 
search. " 68 
Unfortunately, the decisions in Tyler and Mincey are difficult to 
" Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510. 
57 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509-10. 
68 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510-11. 
59 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510-11. 
60 Mincer~- Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978). 
81 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395. 
82 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 388. 
83 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 388-89. 
64 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 389. 
66 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93. 
66 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393. 
1 
67 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395. I 
88 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395. In fact, the search was so thorough that: J 
the entire apartment was searched, photographed, and diagrammed. The officers 
opened drawers, closets, and cupboards, and inspected their contents; they 
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reconcile. Tyler stands for the principle that once exigency justifies a war-
rantless search, the search can continue over a period of hours, even if inter-
rupted, without a warrant.•• Alternatively, Mincey requires a warrant im-
mediately after exigency abates.'0 In terms of applying this precedent to 
police standoffs, the application of each case results in different conclusions. 
Tyler would not require a warrant, as long as exigency is found to exist at the 
start of a police standoff, even if considerable time passes from the inception 
of the standoff until the arrest. However, Mincey would mandate that as soon 
as the initial exigency dissipates, a warrant is required. The analysis under 
the precedent in Mincey would hinge on whether or not exigency is found to 
be continuous throughout the duration of a standoff. Given these two 
conflicting Supreme Court cases, it is no surprise that lower courts are reach-
ing differenfoonclusions regarding exigency during police standoffs. 
II. A TALE OF TWO CIRCUITS: DOES EXIGENCY NEED TO 
BE CONTINUOUSLY EVALUATED DURING A POLICE 
STANDOFF? 
Recently, both the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit were confronted 
with the question of whether exigency exists during a police standoff. In a 
police standoff, the safety of the officers and the public comes into direct 
conflict with the barricaded arrestee's constitutional rights, thus showcasing 
the delicate balance that exists between protecting Fourth Amendment rights 
and protecting public safety. While the facts of both cases are reasonably 
similar, the rulings the courts reached are not, resulting in an emerging circuit 
split. 
A. The Sixth Circuit Standard: Bing v. City of Whitehall 
In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of 
exigency during a police standoff. 71 On October 14, 2002, William Bing left 
his house in an intoxicated state and fired a gun into the air and ground 
outside of his home." Witnesses called police, who upon arrival, learned 
that Bing had retreated into his home.73 Within minutes, police surrounded 
emptied clothing pockets; they dug bullet fragments out of the walls and floors; 
they pulled up sections of the carpet and removed them for examination. Every 
item in the apartment was closely examined and inventoried, and 200-to 300 
objects were seized. In short, Mincey's apartment was subjected to an exhaus-
tive and intrusive search. Id. at 389. 
69 See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510-11, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 
(1978). 
'
0 See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394-95. 
71 Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555, 558, 2006 FED 
App. 0270P (6th Cir. 2006). 
72 Bing, 456 F.3d at 559. 
73 Bing, 456 F.3d at 559. 
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the house and established a perimeter." Police called in a SWAT team, who 
tried unsuccessfully to communicate with Bing." Fearing for the safety of 
the community, the police advised neighbors to evacuate their homes, but 
the neighbors refused to comply." The police further learned that they had 
previously been to Bing's home in response to shots fired, thus increasing 
their'concem about the situation." Shortly after using a f!ashbang device, 
police heard shots from inside the home.78 They entered and shot and killed 
Bing in an exchange of fire.79 By this time, the standoff had lasted for over 
five hours, and no police action during that time was conducted pursuant to 
warrant.'0 The lawsuit, filed by Bing's estate, alleged a violation of Bing's 
Fourth Amendment rights when police entered his home without a warrant." 
The government countered by claiming that exigent circumstances negated 
the warrant requirement. 82 
In conducting its analysis, the Sixth Circuit in Bing first looked to when 
the arrest took place." The court determined that "[b ]y laying siege to Bing's 
house, breaking his door and windows, and employing pepper gas, the po-
lice accomplished a de facto house arrest, i.e., a Fourth Amendment 
seizure."" Bing was considered seized when his home was surrounded, 
because while not formally arrested, he was barricaded in his home and po-
lice coercion exercised physical control over him.85 At the time police sur-
rounded Bing's home, placing him under de facto arrest, the court found that 
exigent circumstances were present, due to the immediate threat Bing posed 
to both police and innocent bystanders. 88 Therefore, the court held that a 
warrant was not required at that particular juncture." 
The court in Bing then looked to the more difficult question of whether 
the mere passage of time negated the original exigency. 88 The court opined 
that because Bing was dangerous at all times during the standoff, the 
exigency did not expire.89 The court explained, "[t]he passage of time did 
not terminate the exigency because the ticking of the clock did nothing to cut 
74 Bing, 456 F.3d at 559. 
75 Bing, 456 F.3d at 560. 
78 Bing, 456 F .3d at 559-60. 
77 Bing, 456 F.3d at 560. 
78 Bing, 456 F.3d at 561. 
79 Bing, 45fF.3d at 562. 
80 See Bing, 456 F .3d at 562. 
81 Bing, 456 F .3d at 558. 
82 See Bing, 456 F.3d at 564. 
83 Bing, 456 F .3d at 564. 
84 Bing, 456 F.3d at 564. 
85 Bing, 456 F.3d at 564. 
88 Bing, 456 F.3d at 564. 
87 Bing, 456 F.3d at 564. 
88 Bing, 456 F.3d at 565. 
89 Bing, 456 F.3d at 565. 
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off Bing's access to his gun, or cure him of his willingness to fire it, or move 
to safety the people nearby who refused to evacuate. "'0 The court looked to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Mincey, which stated "[e]xigent circum-
stances terminate when the factors creating the exigency are negated.' ' 91 
Since Bing continued to be a dangerous threat, the exigency never abated 
during the police standoff.'' 
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit in Bing found that the arrest occurred when 
Bing's house was surrounded, and exigent circumstances justified that war-
rantless arrest.03 Since the threat Bing posed did not cease throughout the 
standoff, the court found that neither did the exigency." In short1 the court 
held that the later actions of the police were justified by the same exigency 
that justified the original arrest, or surrounding of Bing's home." Therefore, 
the Sixth Circuit held that Bing's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated 
- it was reasonable for the police to act without a warrant." 
B. The Ninth Circuit Standard: Fisher v. City of San Jose 
In 2007, the Ninth Circuit decided Fisher v. City of San Jose," a very 
similar case to Bing involving exigency during a police standoff. On October 
23, 1999, a security guard was investigating a complaint of noise emanating 
from the apartment above that of Steven Fisher." Fisher's ground floor apart-
ment had a sliding glass window that led to an enclosed patio, into which 
passersby could see.09 The guard saw Fisher and motioned him outside so 
the two men could speak.1°0 The guard asked Fisher about the noise, but 
Fisher was generally umesponsive.1°1 Fisher seemed to be intoxicated, and 
instead of answering the guard's questions, began rambling about his Second 
Amendment rights.102 During this conversation, Fisher was holding his rifle 
in various positions.103 Feeling uncomfortable, the guard notified his supervi-
90 Bing, 456 F.3d at 565. 
91 Bing, 456 F.3d at 565 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S. Ct. 
2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978)). 
92 Bing, 456 F.3d at 565. 
93 Bing, 456 F.3d at 564. 
94 Bing, 456 F.3d at 565. 
"Bing, 456 F.3d at 564-65. 
00 Bing, 456 F.3d at 569. 
97 Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted, 
519 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008), on reh'g en bane, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2009). 
98 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 954. 
99 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 954. 
100 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 954-55. 
101 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955. 
102 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955. 
103 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955. 
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sor, who in turn contacted police.1°' The first officer on the scene also at-
tempted to communicate with Fisher, but again, he seemed intoxicated and 
not particularly coherent.'°' Police surrounded the apartment, and numerous 
officers came to the scene during the standoff.1°" Shortly after arriving at the 
scene, police discovered that Fisher had been drinking and had eighteen 
rifles in his apartment. '0 ' A few hours into the standoff, Fisher threatened a 
tactical negotiator, and police determined the act to be the commission of a 
felony. 108 Soon after, Fisher pointed his rifles at police, and moved around 
the apartment with the rifles.10' Police concern regarding public safety was 
particularly high, so all of the nearby residents were evacuated from their 
apartments about six hours into the standoff.110 After about twelve hours of 
standoff, Fisher emerged from his apartment and was arrested, without a 
warrant. m Ultimately, Fisher brought suit, claiming that his warrantless ar-
rest was an unreasonable seizure and a violation of his Fourth Amendment 
rights.112 
The Ninth Circuit in Fisher first examined whether the Payton warrant 
requirement applied to the facts of the case.11' While Fisher's formal arrest 
took place outside of his home, the court recognized that this was not in fact 
a public arrest, but rather an in home arrest, thereby requiring a warrant.'" 
The court reasoned that "every court that has considered the issue, including 
our own, has concluded that if the police force a person out of his house to 
arrest him, the arrest is deemed to have taken place inside his home, and the 
Payton warrant requirement applies.''"' The court, upon determining that 
the Payton warrant requirement applied, then looked to whether exigency 
existed to excuse the lack of warrant.'" 
In examining the issue of exigency, the Ninth Circuit recognized that 
time was worthy of consideration.117 The court articulated that implicit in 
exigency is the idea that the interest of time in an emergency hampers the 
164 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955. 
10
' Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955. 
106 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 956. 
107 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955. 
108 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955. Despite the fact that Fisher committed a felony, was 
pointing rifles at police, and moving the rifles around his apartment, no officer com-
municated to Fisher that he was under arrest. Id. 
109 Fisher, 50~ F.3d at 955. 
11° Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955-56. 
m See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 956. 
112 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 956. 
113 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 958; see also supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
114 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 959-60. 
"'Fisher, 509 F.3d at 959 (citing U.S. v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 
1980), judgment aff'd, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 73 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1982)). 
116 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 960. 
117 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 961. 
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ability to obtain a warrant.'" The Ninth Circuit in Fisher agreed with the 
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Bing that the appropriate moment to assess 
"whether the requirements for the exigency exception are met is the mo-
ment at which any entry to effect an arrest or to conduct a search occurs. "
119 
This appears to be the last place where the two courts reach the same 
conclusions. 
Following the Sixth Circuit's basic examination of exigency, and after 
agreeing with the Sixth Circuit's exigency definitions, the Ninth Circuit in 
Fisher took a drastic turn from the reasoning employed by the Sixth Circuit 
in Bing. The Ninth Circuit, after recognizing that a suspect is seized at the 
time police surround his home, drew a distinction between this seizure and 
the subsequent formal arrest.120 The court reasoned: 
[D]espite having been seized, it is indisputable that Fisher had not yet 
been placed under formal arrest and brought into the custody of the 
police. Because Fisher remained in his house, not free to leave but not in 
the custody of police, ~e continued to be subjected to entries into his 
home for the purpose of forcing him outside to arrest him, and the Pay~ 
ton warrant requirement continued to apply .121 
Since the court in Fisher did not consider a formal arrest to have occurred at 
the time Fisher's home was surrounded, it opined that every subsequent 
seizure or entry into Fisher's home required a separate analysis of whether 
exigency existed at the time of that entry or seizure-"' According to the 
Ninth Circuit, exigency could dissipate if the danger posed by the suspect 
decreased, or if through the passage of time, resources became available to 
police to allow them to maintain safety while obtaining a warrant.'" 
Ultimately, the court in Fisher held that exigency must be continuously 
examined throughout the duration of a police standoff to justify warrantless 
police action.124 While the court considered a seizure to have taken place at 
the time Fisher's home was surrounded, they made a distinction between 
this seizure and a formal arrest.'" Since the court found that the formal arrest 
was a separate and distinct Fourth Amendment event from the informal 
seizure of the home, this subsequent event was subject to a new Fourth 
Amendment exigency analysis.''" The distinction between the court's hold-
ing and the Sixth Circuit approach, the court maintained, was not in the stan-
dard articulated, but rather the application of the standard to distinct facts.
12
' 
118 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 961. 
119 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 961. 
12
• Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965. 
121 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965. 
122 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965-66. 
123 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 968. 
"'Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965. 
126 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965. 
126 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 967-68. 
127 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 967-68. 
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The court found that the standoff in Fisher involved significantly less danger 
than the standoff in Bing. 128 Because it held that the formal arrest was a sepa-
rate Fourth Amendment event, and the exigency had abated by this time, the 
court held a warrant was required for the arrest.129 
While the majority opinion in Fisher saw its holding as paralleling the 
SiXth Circuit's holding in Bing, in reality, these two cases cannot be 
reconciled."0 The first approach, adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Bing, 
presumes that if exigency exists at the start of a standoff, it is presumed to 
exist for the duration, because standoffs are inherently dangerous. 131 The 
second standard, adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Fisher, requires an exami-
nation of exigency not only at the connuencement of a standoff, but also 
with every police action throughout the duration of the standoff.'" With this 
emerging circuit split, the question becomes, now what? 
Ill. WHERE TO FROM HERE: COMMON SENSE MAKES 
SENSE 
In examining a police standoff, the courts are attempting a balancing act 
between the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment and the safety of society. 
With the Sixth Circuit position emphasizing the former, and the Ninth Circuit 
position emphasizing the latter, determining which of these positions, and 
therefore societal ideas, should prevail in the instance of a police standoff is 
difficult. But in assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of these ap-
proaches, although the Ninth Circuit's standard does have its benefits, the 
Sixth Circuit standard is ultimately the better reasoned, more connuon sense 
rule for the reasons discussed below. 
A. The Ninth Circuit Rule: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 
The Ninth Circuit standard - requiring exigency to be continually as-
sessed throughout the duration of a police sta11doff - does have the notable 
128 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 967-68. These facts clearly distinguish this case from 
Bing, a case that is in some respects quite similar to this one. Bing had fired his gun 
in the vicinity ofneighborbood children, 'police had been called to Bing's residence 
in the past [because] he previously had fired shots,' neighborhood residents refused 
to evacuate thereby increasing the danger, and police had reason to believe that Bing 
had fired a shot at police officers before they raided his apartment. Bing ex rel. Bing 
v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555, 558-62, 2006 FED App. 0270P (6th Cir. 
2006). None of these factors existed in Fisher's standoff with police. Moreover, as 
far as appears in the Bing opinion, none of the police on the scene returned to the 
station during the standoff. The level of danger in Bing was thus considerably higher 
than here, while the officers' opportunity to obtain an arrest warrant was not obvious. 
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 967. 
129 See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965-66. 
13° Fisher, 509 F.3d at 976 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
131 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 976. 
132 See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 976. 
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benefit that it is a better check on police power. By requiring a warrant if 
exigency dissipates, the Ninth Circuit standard does a better job of protect-
ing the Fourth Amendment's special protection of the home - chiefly by 
requiring a warrant unless police cannot obtain one. By requiring the input 
of a neutral and detached magistrate, the Ninth Circuit provides a constraint 
on police power that the Sixth Circuit does not. 
Although the Nmth Circuit standard does have these benefits, there are 
three significant drawbacks to the standard. First, and perhaps most worri-
some, application of the Ninth Circuit standard by police in the field is 
problematic, if not virtually impossible. The decision m Fisher is unclear m 
articulating exactly when police are required to get a warrant."' Police offic-
ers, while usmg their judgment to end a standoff safely, must also use judg-
ment to try and avoid future litigation. 134 While most would think a police 
standoff is dangerous and exigent from start to finish, this is not the standard 
the Ninth Circuit applies. Instead, police are to "obtam a warrant ... ifthe 
initial exigency dissipates sufficiently." 135 At what point did exigency suf-
ficiently dissipate during the Fisher standoff? After Fisher had been in his 
apartment for two hours, three hours? When he stopped moving? When the 
neighbors had been evacuated? It seems desperately unfair to hold police to 
a standard that even legal professionals cannot articulate. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit's approach flies m the face of precedent."" If a 
warrantless arrest is justified by exigency, no warrant is later required for 
that same arrest.137 While the Ninth Circuit conceded that surrounding the 
home was an arrest, the court failed to confront the problem of requiring a 
warrant to justify a seizure that already occurred.136 The Fourth Amendment 
does not require retroactive or post-hoc warrants, as to do so would be 
unreasonable.139 The entire idea behind exigency is to make a Fourth Amend-
ment event constitutionally valid.140 In fact, the dissent in Fisher recognized 
that 
in every case where exigent circumstances justified an initial intrusion, the 
exigency 'dissipated' in some manner -whether because the suspect is ar-
rested after a hot pursuit, the premises are secured to prevent an escape 
or destruction of evidence, or a danger to the public is neutralized. We 
have never required the officers to, after the fact, go back and obtain a 
warrant to justify the initial lawful intrusion.141 
A standoff is a contmuation of the original arrest, the first and only Fourth 
133 See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 977. 
134 See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 977. 
135 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 962 (majority opinion). 
136 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 974-76 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
137 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 971. 
136 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 971. 
139 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 972. 
140 See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 972. 
141 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 972. 
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Amendment event, and that warrantless arrest was justified due to 
exigency.142 
Third, and finally, the Ninth Circuit standard engages in "arm-chair 
quarterback[ing]." 143 It seems inherently unfair for judges, in the safety of 
ch~mbers, to question police decisions made in the heat of the moment.'" 
The dissent in Fisher argued that "[s]uch post-game analysis is discon-
nected from reality and leads to the puzzling determination in tills case that 
San Jose police officers need training despite . . . [doing] nothlng wrong."'" 
This "arm-chair quarterback[ing]" is even evidenced by the phraseology 
used throughout the case. Many of the facts cited were facts known to the of-
ficers only after resolution of the matter. In fact, one of the first paragraphs 
of the opinion describes facts that were not readily available to officers dur-
ing the standoff, but rather were facts from the viewpoint of Fisher himself. 
The Ninth Circuit begins its recitation of the facts with, "[o]n the afternoon 
of Saturday, October 23, 1999, Fisher bought two twelve-packs of beer and 
settled in at home for an evening of watching the World Series and cleaning 
rifles from his collection of approximately eighteen World War II-era 
fireanns.' " 46 From the police perspective at the time of the standoff, Fisher 
was not your average baseball watcher. He was an intoxicated, gun wielding 
man who was an extreme danger to the community. To later question police 
decisions is ludicrous, particularly with access to facts unknown at the time. 
B. The Sixth Circuit Rule: The Good or Just Better? 
The Sixth Circuit rule also has its shortcomings. First, it allows police 
power to go essentially unchecked during a police standoff. By removing the 
power of the detached magistrate, we "permit officers to invade the sanctity 
of the home indefinitely and in new, and more intrusive ways. " 147 The 
purpose of a warrant is to limit the actions of police. Theoretically, if a 
standoff continues for many hours, the police can continue to do whatever is 
necessary to force a subject out of his home, and have no warrant for any 
activity. The Sixth Circuit standard also fails'to consider the ease with which 
warrants can be obtained. Only one officer would have to leave the scene of 
a standoff.146 
All things being equal, however, the Sixth Circuit standard is the better 
142 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 972. 
143 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 969. 
144 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 969. 
145 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 969. 
146 Fisher, 509 F .3d at 954 (majority opinion). 
141 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 964. 
148 In fact, in Fisher, the majority opinion articulates this point, saying: 
(s]ome of the original officers left the scene at 7 a.m. and returned to the station 
house, where they or their colleagues could have initiated warrant proceedings. 
By 1 p.m., many officers had been at Fisher's apartment complex for several 
hours; in total, more than 60 officers participated over the course of the standoff 
between the police and Fisher. 
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reasoned, easier to apply, more bright-line rule. First, it is simple common 
sense that there is a threat of serious bodily injury throughout the entire 
duration of a police stand off, thus the standoff constitutes exigent circum-
stances from start to finish. In fact, ifthere was no threat of bodily injury, to 
either police or the public, there wouldn't be a police standoff in the first 
place. Police would leave the scene, because there would be no immediate 
reason to arrest. It is ridiculous logic to claim that a police standoff is not 
dangerous the entire time. If one finds that a standoff constitutes exigent cir-
cumstances from start to finish, then no warrant is required, as under the 
Sixth Circuit standard. 
Second, the Sixth Circuit standard is superior to that of the Ninth Circuit 
because it does not overly regulate police. Police are skilled at defusing 
potentially deadly situations. There is reason to believe they have good 
judgment. Not only do police complete numerous hours of training, but they 
also have on the job experience. It seems a bit ridiculous for judges or com-
mon citizens to overanalyze police action in such situations, when neither 
has the training or experience to form such judgments. Using hindsight to 
question police on their proficiency at handling standoffs is a fruitless and 
unreasonable exercise. 
Third and finally, the standard articulated by the Sixth Circuit is clear. 
Police in the field know what actions are allowed and what actions are not. 
Police will be aware that once a decision is made regarding exigency, they 
are justified in using reasonable means to effectuate a formal arrest and take 
the arrestee into custody. It is the job of the courts to articulate legal stan-
dards and clarify what actions will subject a person to litigation. It would be 
somewhat useless to have a standard that is impossible to apply, such as that 
of the Ninth Circuit. What purpose would such a rule have? 
CONCLUSION 
The danger that exists in a police standoff is incredible. Officers are 
called upon to make tactical decisions that may determine life or death. 
Simultaneously, the Fourth Amendment is implicated during police standoffs 
as the lone barrier to unchecked police power. The Fourth Amendment's key 
phrase, however, is "reasonable." When other demands outweigh the 
reasonableness of protecting a person from seizure within his home, the 
Fourth Amendment still allows the police action. Interestingly, both cases 
examined by the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit ended with no innocent 
fatalities. One could wonder, if the cases had ended differently, how that 
would have affected the outcomes. The protection of life is ultimately a rea-
sonable justification for allowing police the power to arrest without a war-
rant in a police standoff. 
Unfortunately, there are two different approaches to dealing with 
exigency during a police standoff situation. While the issue is anything but 
clear for courts, the likelihood of either Bing or Fisher being successfully 
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 967. 
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appealed to the Supreme Court is low. The Supreme Court has previously 
had numerous chances to define and explore exigency, all of which the Court 
has openly dismissed. Unfortuuately, this leaves lower courts to struggle in 
defining aud applying exigeucy in all contexts, as well as in police standoffs. 
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower. court jurisprudence should 
parallel what common sense dictates. Police standoffs are exigent from their 
inception until the arrestee is finally in police Custody, and as such, a warrant 
should not be required. 
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